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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
ANTHONY G. HARRIS, Feceiver
of Mobile Insurance Company,

)

)
)

)
)

Plaintiff and
Appellant,

-vsIDBERr BRIGGS and INTER-OUNTAIN

GENERAL AGENCY, INC. ,

Cefendants and
Fesp:mdents.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 16841

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal of a suit by the statuatory receiver of a
Texas Insurance Company against Inte.nrountain General Agency, Inc. , agent

of r.bbil Insurance Canpany and Robert Briggs, a Utah resident as an
individual.

On September 21, 1978, the District Court of Travis County,

Texas, entered a final judgment against the Defendants Briggs and Inter-

m:n.mtain, jointly and severally for $145,654 .57, plus interest.

This

judgrrent has never been satisfied and the Plaintiff-Receiver sought to
enforce the Texas judgrrent against the tefendants in the Third District
Court of Utah.
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DISPOSITION

rn

LCWER CDURI:'

Prior to trial, Plaintiff and D:fendant each moved for
surnnary judgment, Plaintiff arguing that the Texas judgnent was final
and was entitled to full faith and credit, and D:fendants arguing
that the Texas court had not acquired personal jurisdiction over then
and therefore the judgrrent against them was void and unenforcible.
On November 15, 1979, the G.--ial a::mrt denied Plaintiff's notion for
surnnary judgrrent.

Because Plaintiff's and D:fendant 's motions addressed

different issues, a question arose as to whether the D:fendant's
rrotion had been fully argued.

D:fendant' s counsel stipulated that the

matter could be reconsidered by the trial court and the oourt entertained additional affidavits and argurrent on the issue of whether the
Texas court had personal jurisdiction over the D:fendants.

On

November 27,

1979, the trial oourt ruled that doo process, required the Plaintiff to
try his claims in Utah, and again granted D:fendant' s rrotion for

surrrnary judgment.

From this judgrrent, Plaintiff appealed.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

D:fendant-Fespondent seeks an affinration of both surmm:y
judgrrents entered November 15, 1979 and November 27, 1979.
FACTS
On May 1, 1972, Interrrountain Gene;ri:al Agency, Inc.

(Interrroun-

tain) entered into a general agency agreerrent with Mobil Insurance
company (~bbil) located in Dallas, Texas.

Pursuant to this contract,

Intermountain became the agent of Mobil and until August of 1975

- 2 -
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conducted a continuous course of insurance business between Intenrountain
and M)bil.

Intenrountain, directly and through sub-agents solicited,

sold, and issued insurance p:>licies to Utah residents living in Utah,
and M)bil issued !;X)licies for insurance.

On

a regular basis Intenroun-

tain collected and remitted premiurrs to the Texas insurance company.
The policies were issued in Texas and the records and transactions
between

~bil

and Inte:rnountain were generated and stored in Texas as

to the insurance company's records and records of the transactions
were also naintained by Inte:rnountain in Utah.

Loss claims were filed

in Texas where they were reviewed and allcwed or disallcwed.

Payments,

pursuant to contract, were nade in Texas.
Prior to August, 1975, Mobil beca:rre insolvent and was unable
to pay a nunber of claims tendered to it.

This, in spite of the fact

that Intennountain had forwarded all required premilUtlS to the company.
On or about August 21, 1975, delinquency proceedings were carnenced by
the State of Texas through its insurance commission against M:>bil under
the Texas Insurance Ccrle.

M:>bil was placed in receivership and

Plaintiff-Appellant Harris was subsequently ap!;X)inted as successor-receivor
to succeed Herbert Crook who initially instituted these legal proceedings
in TeXa.s.

The thrust of Plaintiff's complai..nt in the Texas litigation

was that because M:Jbil had gone into receivership and because all of the
:i;olicies written by M:>bil were no longer being honored by M:>bil, that
the comnissions received by the D=fendant, Inte.nrountain, were therefore
uneamed commissions and would have to be returned to Mobil through its
receiver to be distributed to tbe various insureds.

Inte:rnountain's con-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for- digitization
3 - provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

tention was that the vast majority of these premiums had not been
received by Intenrountain, but had been received by twenty-three or
rrore sub-agents of Inte:rnountain who were rrobile horn: dealers in Utah
and who sold the tnlicies to the various insureds at the ti.Ire of
the purchase of the rrobile hares.

In view of the fact that these

sub-agents were all residents of Utah, doing business solely and
exclusively within the State of Utah, and selling insurance to Utah
residents only, and in vieN of the fact that they had received the
vast. majority of funds which were now classified as unearned comnissions,
it would be necessary for Intenrountain to join all of these sub-agents
as Cross-r:efendants in this action and that this could be best done in
litigation in Utah and not in Texas.
On or about August 19 , 19 77, a corrplaint was filed by Plain-

tiff's predecessor as receiver of Mobil against Intenrountain and
additionally against Defendant Briggs personally, alleging that the
:cefendants previously had entered into a general agency agreerrent with
Mobil and making allegations that Cefendants were delinquent in paying
earned prerni lUTlS and unearned oorrmissions aved to MJbil.

The receiver

sought to reoover those arrounts allegedly owing to the receivership
and filed his original :t:etition in the 20lst Judicial District Court
of Travis County, Texas.

:cefendant Briggs filed a special app:arance

and notion to quash on or about August 31, 19 77 appearing pro se.

On

March 22, 1978, the Plaintiff filed his first arrended original t:etition.

cefendants were served with copies on March 27, 1978 by service upon
the Texas secretary of State in acrordance with Tex.Fev.Civ.Stat.Ann.Art·
2031b.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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'!he Secretary of State for the State of Texas subsequently fonvarded
copies to the Defendants in Utah..

In March, 1978, Defendants Briggs

and Intemountain filed an answer in the Texas proceeding preserving
the special app:arano:.

The answer was signed by Briggs personally ..

Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a brief in op:r;:osition to the special
appearance of Defendants, and the special appearance was noticed
for hearing on September 14, 1978.
in Salt

~e

On June 23, 1978, Briggs was deposed

City in the Texas action.

The deposition was taken at

the office of Lambertus Jansen, but contrary to the allegations of
fact in Plaintiff-Appellant' s brief, Mr. Jansen did not appear as
oounsel for Briggs, but rrerely as an accomrodation to Mr. Briggs and
to Texas counsel in the matter.

Thereafter, on July 18, 1978, notice

was given to the Defendants by the District Court for Travis County,
Texas, that hearing on their special appearano: had been set for
September 14, 1978, at 2:00 p.m. and the trial was set for September 21,
1978.

On September 14, 1978, the hearing on the special appearance
was held.

Defendants nade no appearano: at that hearing and subsequently

rre.de no appearance at the hearing on the trial of the natter.

Judgrrent

was rendered against the Defendants as heretofore stated and this judgrrent remains wholly unsatisfied.

On Janua:cy 29, 1979, Plaintiff filed a canplaintin the District
Court of Utah, seeking to enforce the Texas judgrrent against the Defendants.

Both parties rroved for summary judgnait and refendants ' motion

for sunmary judgrrent was granted.

Subsequently, the Plaintiffs took

this appeal.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINT I:

THE Ul'AH TRIAL COURI' RULED PROPERLY THAT PS A MATrER

OF LM'V' THE TEXAS JUI:G1ENr WAS N0r ENTITLED TO FULL FAI'IH AND CREDIT;
THE TEXAS COURI' WPS

wrrnour

JURISDICTION AND THAT ISSUE WAS PIDPERLY

ATI'ACKED BY DEFENDANTS• MYI'ION FOR SUMMARY
Subpoint A.

JtJIX;MENT.

The Utah Court has the power to look behind

the issue of jurisdiction even though that has been raised by a notion
to quash in the foreign jurisdiction.

It is clearly establiShed that a Court in one state, when
asked to give effect to the judgnent of a Court in another state,
may constitutionally inquire into the foreign Court's jurisdiction
to render the judgment.

This logic was clearly followed by the Utah

Suprerre Court in the case of Chevron Chemical Company vs. M:cham, 550
P. 2d. 182, (Utah 1976).

In that case, the Third District Court

denied enforcerrent of an Idaho judgment obtained against the Defendant
Mecham.

The Court in affirming the District Court ruling, held that

an individual who was an officer of a corporation located in Idaho,
who gave guarantees to a Plaintiff to indemnify it against losses which
it might incurr on acoounts with the corporation, but who only ire.de
one trip to Idaho and had no contacts with any customer, supplier or;
lending institution, and who never asserted a business presenre in
Idaho was not subject to jurisdiction of Idaho Courts under the Idaho
Long Ann Statute.

In that case, M:cham signed a personal guarantee

of the loan and mailed that to the Idaho Plaintiff.

M:cham, a resident
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of Utah, was an officer of an Idaho corporation..

The Court noted that

Mecham had never asserted a business presence in Idaho, had no busines
address in that state, had no telephone listing in that state, and as
an individual had rever consunnated a business transaction in Idaho ..
M=cham nade a si:::ecial appearance in the Idaho proceedings to challenge

the jurisdiction of that Court, but judgrrent was rendered against him.
The Utah Suprerre Court in examining the issue stated that,
"In detellnining whether or not the Court of the forum
state has jurisdiction, certain standards and guidelines
have been enunciated by the courts of the various jurisdictions. Those standards include the following guidelines:
( 1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

The nature and quality of the contacts of the
forum state;
Quantity of such contacts;
Relationship of the cause to the contact;
Interest of the forun state in providing a forum
for its residents;
The convenience of the parties .

'!hose sane issues were examined by the trial court in this instant
action, and the Third District Court ruled that the Texas Court did
not have jurisdiction over the Cefendants and that therefore, the
judgrrent was not entitled to full faith and credit.
In examining the facts in the present action, it should be
noted. that Briggs made only one trip to the State of Texas, not to
engage in any business, but to tour the new office building of M::>bil.

Too, that neither Briggs or Intenrountain naintained any business
presence in Texas; they had no office, no residence, no telephone
listing.

They sold no p::>licies to Texas residents and the only course

of dealing with any Texas entity was the mailing of premiums and the
receipt of insurance policies by mail with the Texas corrpany.

Nowhere

in the pleadings or in the affidavits on file in these proceedings is
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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there any showing that ei th.er Briggs or Intemountain did business in
Texas.

Nor did any of the tr

ti
ansac ons engaged in by either Briggs

or Intemountain involve any Texas residents other than the defaulting
Texas COI'p)ration.
The Court is further cited to Com vs. Whi tnore, 9 Utah 2d.
250, 243 P. 2d 871, {Utah 1959).

Therein the Court stated that,

"TI:ere must be some substantial activity which correlates
with the purpose to engage in a C'Ourse of business or
sorre continuity of activity in the state so that deeming
the defendant to be present therein is founded upon a
realistic basis, and is not a rrere fiction."
Clearly, it would 1:e a rrere fiction to conclude that Intenrountain or
Briggs were conducting any business in Texas when they had no business
presence there, maintained no office, no telephone listing, and had
no dehlings with Texas residents.
In the farrous case of Pennoyer vs. Neff, (1877) 95 U.S. 714,
24 L.F.d.565, it was established that the due process clause of the
14th Arrendrrent is violated where a Court renders a personal judgment
against a non-resident individual Defendant without having jurisdiction
over him, and that as a matter of due course, it cannot acquire such
jurisdiction merely by serving process upon him outside the forum or by
publication.

Since Pennoyer vs. Neff, the C'Oncept of state jurisdiction

over non-residents has been greatly expanded.

However the Court should

look clearly at the direction that the Supreme Court has been expanding
such jurisdiction.

In the leading case of International Shoe Conpany

vs. Washington (1945) 326 U.S. 310, 90 L.Ed. 95 66 S.Ct. 154, 161 A.L.R.

105 7, the Supreme Court held that a foreign C'O:rporation which systemati-
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cally and continually employed a force of salesmen, residents of
the state of forum to canvas orders therein, C'Ould, consistently
with due process, be sued in the state to recover contributions to
the state tm.errployment oonpensation fund in respect to their salesrren.
What·the Plaintiff-Appellant is attempting to do here is to convert
that rational in the exact OPPJSite direction.

If residents of the

State of Utah had desired to file suit against Mobil in Utah, in
view of the fact that Mobil had nurrerous insurance policies in effect

in Utah, sold to them by residents of the State of Utah who were agents
or sub-agents of a Utah corporation, as is the case here, there would
be no doubt that M)bil would be subject to the Long Arm Statute

diction and would be required to defend in Utah.

juris-

However, it is a

fallacy to conclude therefore, that because Mobil coUld be sued in
Utah by Utah residents who were holders of Mobil's policies, that

MJbil therefore can sue in Texas against Utah residents on transactions
which occurred in Utah and affect Utah residents only.

Clearly, Plaintiff-

Appellant is trying to put the cart before the horse by asking this
Court to approve such a conclusion.
Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant cites a nurrber of cases in
support of this position.
sum:narily.

However, those can be disp:>sed of rather

Counsel cites Stoll vs. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 59 s.ct.

134, 83 L.Ed. 104 (1938) .

HONever, in that case the first judgment was

in the Federal Bankruptcy Court, a Court of general jurisdiction and
the issues involved the suprerna.cy clause and the jurisdiction of federal
oourts and has nothing to do with full faith and credit.

- 9 -

Counsel cites
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Trinies vs. Sunshine Mining CD., 308 U.S. 66, 60 S.Ct. 44, 84 L.Ed 85
(1939).

However, that was a Federal Court case again which dealt with

subject natter jurisdiction and not in personam jurisdiction, again
not applicable to this situation.

Counsel further cites Sherrer vs.

Sherrer 334 U.S. 343, 68 S.Ct. 1087, 92 L.Ed 1429 (1948).

In this

instance the Defendant made a general appearance and not a special
appearance, and again the facts are not even similar to the fact
situation which we are dealing with in this case. In Sherrer, the issue
was whether the Plaintiff had been a resident of the state and county
long enough to be a resident for jurisdiction in a divorce action.

The

Court found that the Plaintiff had been a resident long enough and the
Massachusetts CDurt concluded that it oouldn't decide the issue of
whether the Plaintiff was a resident long enough in view of the fact
that the local court had reached the conclusion that the Plaintiff had
been a resident for a substantial period.

The fact situations are so

substantially different as to render Sherrer not renotely applicable.
CDunsel further cites Raynor vs. Stockton Savings

&

Loan Bank, 332 P. 2d.

416, (Cal. 1958), but in that instance there was a general aH_:>earance
by Defendant, again rendering the case not applicable for precedent in
this matter.

The sane is true of Sanpietro vs. CDllins, 250 Cal.App.2d.

230 Cal.Rptr 219 (1967), Heuer vs. Heuer, 201 P.2d. 385,(cal.1949).
CDunsel also cites Davis vs. Davis, 305 U.S. 32 59 s.ct. 3, 83 L.Ed. 26
(1938) and in the Davis case, there was not only personal service but
there was a subsequent general appearance.

Finally, in Sub-Point A of

Plaintiff-Appellant's agrurrent, he cites Baldwin vs. Iowa State Travelillg_

- provided
10 - by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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~ns

Association 283 U.S. 522 51 s.ct. 517 75 L.Ed. 1244 (1930), and

the ruling in that case was that full faith and credit required by the
constitution is not involved where neither of the Courts c:oncerned
was a state court.

Cmmsel further relies on Durfey vs. Duke, 375 U.Sc

106 84 S.Ct. 242 (1963) •

This was a Federal Court case that dealt

with in rem jurisdiction and not in personam jurisdiction.

The issue

was whether once the Nebraska Federal Court had ruled that a piece of
land was located in Nebraska, whether the Missouri Federal Court coulct
deteJ::mine whether Nebraska ·had jurisdiction over the land.

None of

these cases cited by Plaintiff-Appellant are in any way similar to
the circmnstances alleged in these proceedings, and none of them should
be oonsidered prece::1ent for the type of holding Plaintiff-Appellant

is requesting herein.
Sub-Point B:

Defendants never waived their special appearance,

never submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the Court, and therefore are entitled to attack that jurisdiction collaterally.
Contrary to the allegations found in Plaintiff-Appellant's
brief, conversations held between Plaintiff's Texas c:ounsel and Defendants' Utah counsel, clearly were to the effect that counsel in Texas
would not hold Briggs or Intemountain to the specific niceties of the
rules of procedure with regard to swom staterrents, and now Plaintiff's
Utah counsel is atterrpting to do that.

This is grossly tm.fair and

clearly arcounts to an overreaching on the part of the Plaintiff-Appellant.
Counsel for Plaintiff cites Brown

"VS.

Brcwn, 520 s.w. 2d. 571

(Tex.Civ.App.1975) as precedent for the contention that Briggs and
Intenrountain by failing to appear at the hearing on their special appear-

ance,Sponsored
waived
special
nature
ofdigitization
theirprovided
appearance
this
acrounted
by thethe
S.J. Quinney
Law Library.
Funding for
by the Institute and
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and Library
Services
to
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~~;~"y~- · ·=
If

. ·:

:;reneral jurisdiction.

The Court will

examine Brown vs. Brown, they will note substantial differences in
that action, which was an action for divorce from this present action.
Cefendant Brown was personally served within the State of Texas and
wherein he stipulated that in the event he failed to make rronthly
~ra:ry

alirrony payrrents, his special appearance would be converted

to a general appearance.

The Cefendant then failed to nake his

timely paym:nts and thus there was a stipulation that the D:fendant
had appeared personally and generally within the State of Texas.
is not the case here; contrary to

Plaintiff~Appellant's

Such

allegation,

there is a stipulation that none of the Cefendants' conduct in
attempting to represent themselves in this action, would constitute
a waiver of their special appearance.

Plaintiff-Ai;:pellant should

therefore be estopped from alleging any such allegation in the brief
to this Court.
In sumrrary therefore, this Court should affirm the findings
and rulings of the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah by sustaining its ruling in Chevron vs. M:cham and Conn
vs. Whitm::>re.

The Third District Court was clearly within its peroga-

tive to examine the affidavits of the Cefendant and detennine that

Texas

was without jurisdiction to proceed against the Cefendants in Texas
and that the matter should have been initially prosecuted in Utah.
POINT II.

THE TRIAL COURI' PIDPERLY HELD THAT "N3 A MATIER

OF I.MV, 'IHE TEXAS COURI' DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFENrnNI'S
AT THE TIME IT ENTERED ITS
Sub-Point A.

~.

The District Court of Texas did not acquire

personal jurisdiction over the Cefendants under its long Ann Statute.
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Section Three of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes Annotated, Article
20 31B, provides that:
Any foreign o:n:poration or non-resident, natural person,
that engages in business in the state and does not rraintain
a place of regular business in the state or a designated
agent upon whom service may be made upon cause of action
arising our of such business done in the state, the act
or acts of engagiig in such business within the state shall
be deerred equivalent to an appointrrent by such foreign
co:rporation or non-resident, natural person, of the Secretary
of State of Texas as its agency "UpOn whom service of process
rray be made in any action, suit, or proceedings arising
out of such business done in the state, wherein such cor:poration or non-resident, natural person is a party or
is to be made a party.
Therefore, service of process upon the Texas Secretary of State is
proi;:er only where the foreign oorporation or non-resident/natural person,
satisfied three threshhold requirements:
(1)
(2)
(3)

That he does not maintain a regular place of business
in Texas.
That he is not a designated agent in Texas for serving.
He engages in business in Texas.

Therefore, we get down to the threshhold question!
or Briggs do business in Texas?"

"Did Interm:>untain

It is acknowledged that the :cefendants

did not maintain any regular place of business in Texas and did not
designate an agent in Texas for service of process.
Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant claims that all that is necessary to do business in Texas is for an individual to enter into a contract

by rrail with a resident of Texas to be perforrred in whole or in part
by either party in Texas.

It cites U-Anchor Advertising vs. Burt 553 S .W.

2d. 760 (Tex. 1977) , in sup:port of this pro:posi tion.

Actually U-Anchor

Advertising is far rrore favorable to the Defendants than it is to the

- 13-
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Plaintiff-Appellant.

In

U-Anchor Advertising a rontract between the

I:efendant OklahoID3. businessrran and a Texas advertising conpany.was
solicited by the Texas corrpany in Oklahom3..

The oontract was signed

in Oklahoma and required the Texas company to place displays in
Oklahana.

The only rontact that the I:efendant had with Texas was

that he was required to send his payments to the rorrpany's office in
Amarillo, Texas.

When the rontract was breached, the advertising

rorrpany attempted to sue the I:efendant in Texas.

The Texas Suprerre

Court held that the exercise of Long-Arm jurisdiction would violate
the Defendant's right to due process of law.
"In the instant case, the contacts of Burt with Texas are
minimal and fortuitous, and he cannot be said to have

purposefully ronducted activities within the state.
Burt's contacts with Texas were not grounded on any
e~ctation or necessity of invoking the benefits of
protections of Texas law, nor were they designed
to result in profit fran a business transaction undertaken in Texas. The contract was scDlicited, negotiated,
and consum:nated in Oklahoma., and Burt did nothing to
indicate or to support an inference of any purpose to
exercise the privilege of doing business in Texas.
Simply stated, Burt was a passive custorrer of a Texas
COI:poration who neither sought, initiated, or profited
from his single and fortuitous rontact with Texas."
In the present case, we have Utah D:fendants who entered into a contract

with a Texas rorporation, wherein all business transactions were
conducted in the State of Utah.

Defendants sold insurance policies,

either directly or through sub-agents, to Utah residents, and the only
contact that the D=fendants had with Texas was that they were required
to send payrrents to the rompany' s office in Texas.

In addition to

the similarity of circumstances, there is an added feature which
clearly requires that the original proceedings in this matter be
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
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brought in Utah, which were not present in the U-Anchor case.

In

present case, the D:fendant would have cross-claims against twentythree (23) or rrore Utah sub-agents for any of the unearned corrmissions
for Which the Plaintiff is allegedly suing.

Those sub-agents are

all residents of the State of Utah, are all doing business solely in
the State of Utah, and would not be subject to jurisdiction of the
Texas

Court.

'Ihus, it would be necessary for the D:fendants to file

twenty-three (23) separate actions in the State of Utah against those
sub-agents to recover the majority of the funds which Plaintiff claims
it is entitled to.

Thus, where all of the litigation could be cleared

up in one lawsuit in Utah, had the Plaintiff-Appellant elected to

sue in Utah, the result if this Court is to affirm the Texas Court's
jurisdiction in this matter will be to suddenly promulgate twenty-three
or :m:'.)re additional sui.ts in the State of Utah by the D:fendants-Fesp::>ndents
against those various sub-agents.
Sub-Point B.

'Ihe assunption of jurisdiction by the Texas

Court offends the traditional notions of fair play and substantial

justice.
As

previously

~lained,

the Texas Suprerre Court in U-Anchor

looked at the nature and extent of the contacts of the non-resident
with the forum state to detennine whether the Court could exercise
jurisdiction over the non-resident.

In U-Anchor, the Court concluded

that there were not such contacts, and this Court can look at the
affidavits and other docunents on file in these proceedings, and conclude
as did the Court belcw, that there were not the kinds of contacts with
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the State of Texas that would give the Texas Court jurisdiction over
the Defendants herein.

Counsel for Plaintiff states, "It would have

been and would be however inronvenient to require Plaintiff to litigate
each cause of action against each non-resident insurance agent in their
resp:ctive states.

Not only is it rrore convenient to allow Plaintiff

to litigate each cause of action in Travis County, Texas, it is also
rrore equitable to the receivership estate, and as many creditors,
claimants and individual insureds, includ.ing Utah residents entitled to
disburserrents from the receivership estate for the nurrerous causes
of action against non-resident agents to be prosecuted in an efficient
and economical nianner."

Such an allegation is rrerely window dressing.

Once the Plaintiff-Respondent had filed its lawsuits in Texas and had
obtained judgment, it is still necessary for him to go to the state
wherein the individual defendants reside and file subsequent actions,
such as this one, to enforce those judgrrents.

The Plaintiff-Appellant

has, therefore, doubled the number of lawsuits necessary, by first

filing nurrerous actions in Texas, and then having obtained judgm:mts,
filing numerous actions in various other states to enforce those judgrrents, when the Plaintiff-Appellant rould have gone directly to the
state of residence of the individual defendants and filed only one
lawsuit.

To talk in te:r::rns of duplication, waste·.,! and inefficiency,

being avoided by such a tack, seems totally illogical.

It is ll'npossi-

ble for Defendants to see how two lawsuits are better than one.

And,

when we add to that, the number of cross-claims which will of necessity
have to be filed, they are saying twenty-five lawsuits are better than
one.

How such a theory can avoid waste and duplication totally escai;:es
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counsel for

~fendants.

Counsel cites Burt Drilling, Inc. vs. Portadrill, (No. 15709,

filed March 4, 1980, Utah), in supp.Jrt of his position.

In Burt Drill-

ing, Inc. , the Utah corporation was penni tted jurisdiction over a California corporation with its principal place of business in San Francisco,
and this Court should look very carefully at that decision and compare
it with the fact situation in the present case.

There, the

~fendants

delivered drilling equiprrent whi-ch eventually ended up in Utah.

They

sent representatives to examine and repair the machinery when it malfunctioned in Utah, and sent invoices and price lists to the Plaintiff
in Utah.

Discussing the requirenents of "minimum contacts, the Utah

Court stated:

(1)
(2)

Defendant purposefully contracted with the resident
of this state, knowing that it was a resident, and
~fendant purposefully undertook to supply goods
to that resident reasonably kncwing or anticipating
that those goods would be used in this state.

This clearly reiterates the position noted by Cotmsel for the

~fendant-

Fest:endents previously, that, were the fact situations changed and, were
the Defendants suing the Plaintiff in Utah under Utah's Long-Arm Statute
for breach of contract on all of the insurance policies which were
written in Utah and which were not honored by Mobil, this Court could
clearly take jurisdiction over l'bbil; ho.vever, the reverse is not
nea:ssarily true.

True, Intenrountain entered into a oontract with

M:>bil with all economic benefit derived out of that contract generated
in Utah and all products, i.e. insurance policies, delivered to residents
of Utah.

It is the residents and the agents and sub-agents located in

Utah who have been injured by .MJbil 's conduct.

If Mobil had conducted
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its business in a business-like mmner, there would be no litigation.
It is Mbbil who breached the agreerrent by accepting premiums for
insurance and then not being in a position to pay claims.

Counsel

for Plaintiff-Appellant has consistently atterrpted to make the
Defendants wear the black hat in these proceedings, but it should be
noted that it is the Plaintiff's predecessor 'Who is in default, for
it is Mobil who becarre insolvent and could not pay cla.irrs, and it is
the residents of the State of Utah who have been injured.

The State

of Texas has not been injured in.this situation, and the notions
of fair play and substantial justice require that those individuals
in Utah who have been injured should have the perogative of choosing
the fort.ml.
Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant finally concludes that to
require the Plaintiff to re-tty the Texas judgment in a Utah Court
would necessitate the transportation of htmdreds of documents at great
expense and delay, both for the receiver himself, and for all those,
including numerous Utah residents, who have filed claims against the
receivership.

Hc:Mever, D:fendants find it difficult to see that as a

distinction because the D:fendants would be required to travel to

Texas

at great expense, trans};X)rt hundreds of doaments in their possession,
reach a detennin.ation as to what arnot.mts, if any, are due the receiver,
and then go back to Utah :and litigate twenty-three or nore causes of
action against sub-agents in order to obtain the funds to p:ty all of
these alleged, but tmproved claims.
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CONCLUSION

The trial oourt ruled properly in refusing to extend full
faith and credit to the Texas judgrrent and that ruling should be affirmed
by this Court.

The Texas District Court could not properly assurre

jurisdiction over either of the Cefendants in view of the fact that
neither of the Defendants ever conducted any business in Texas.

The

rrere fact that there was an agency agreerrent in existence between
Cefendant Intennountain and lt)bil Insurance Company of Texas wherein
M:)bil wrote insurance policies in favor of Utah residents insuring
property located in Utah and Interrrountain submitted premium payrrents
to MJbil for that insurance and does not constitute Interirountain or
Briggs as ever having done business in Texas.

The record before the

Court indicates that Defendants maintained no business presence in
Texas and have never asserted a business presence there.

They had no

business address in Texas , had no telephone listing, and there is no
shewing that as an individual, Briggs had ever consurmE.ted a business
transaction in Texas, his only trip to Texas being for the purpose of
looking at the new office building that Mobil had built as a guest of
.lt>bil.

Defendants were never waived their special appearance, and

by admission of Counsel for Plaintiff, the Answer filed by the Defendants

preserved the special appearance, and that special appearance was
preserved by the Cefendants throughout the proceedings through corrmunication between Counsel for Plaintiff and Defendants Counsel in Utah.
Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant in Utah is new attenpting to convert

- 19 -
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that special appearance into a general appearance solely because
Plaintiff-Appellant cannot prevail under any other theo:cy.

Due

process requires the Plaintiff-Apr:ellant to litigate its claims in
Utah, where not only the Cefendants will be present to proceed on
the basis of its records here in Utah, but will: be enabled to join
as Cross-Cefendants sorre twenty-three or nore sub-agents who received
the substantial portion of the carrmissions which Plaintiff-Appellant
claims are unearned and therefore the property of M:>bil.

This Court

should affinn the ruling of the Third Judicial District Court and
require Plaintiff-Appellant to litigate its claim against the Utah
Defendants in Utah and deny Plaintiff-Appellant full faith and credit
on the Texas judgnent.
DATED this

;{fy

il/ -

.
day of May, 1980.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITrED,

- 20 -

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Brief to Jerry R. Kennedy, Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant,
a5 900 Kearns Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101, by deix:>siting

the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, on this

-:llv

16':

day of May, 1980.

- 21 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

